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MAY AN INFANT DISAFFIRM A CONTRACT WHICH
HE HAS INDUCED THE OTHER PARTY TO
ENTER BY MISREPRESENTING HIS AGE ?
Although it is well settled in Missouri' that an infant is
not estopped from relying on his infancy where he has nis-
represented his age, the rule has not always been stated with
1. 188 Mo. App. 402.
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such precision in other jurisdictions. As this question has
never been fully considered in Missouri, it will be necessary
for us to concern ourselves with cases cited elsewhere, both
pro and con, in order to investigate the matter in a few of its
most important aspects.
In the first place, it seems almost self-evident that if the
contract or transaction is considered absolutely void, no es-
toppel can arise by reason of the infant's misrepresentation as
to his age. But it is when we turn to the merely voidable civil
transaction that we find the conflict of authority. In some
jurisdictions it has been held that such false representation by
an infant of his age does not give any validity to the trans-
action or estop the infant from disaffirming it or setting up the
defense of infancy against the enforcement of any rights there-
under. This rule has been applied to deeds, mortgages, and
other instruments affecting an infant's realty.2
These decisions are based on the idea that a conveyance
by an infant is in itself an assertion of his right to convey,
and that a contemporaneous declaration of his right or of his
age adds nothing to what is already implied in the deed or
contract. In other words, an assertion -of an estoppel against
him is but a claim that he has assented or contracted, a thing
which he can no more do effectively than he can make the
contract alleged to be confirmed. The underlying reasoning is
that the fraud of misrepresentation of age does not restore
validity to the promise, or, in any way enhance its obligation;
but that it is the contract which forms the sole basis of lia-
bility; and that if an infant were to be estopped from disaffirm-
ing on the ground that he represented himself to be of age,
2. 102 U. S. 300. 150 Mo. 606.
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then the result would be that a plaintiff, in an action of as-
sumpsit on a contract which the law holds void, would re-
cover damages for an injury caused by the fraudulent mis-
representations of the defendant, it being manifest that no
such confusion of rights and remedies can exist in the law.5
Let it be understood here that those cases which hold that an
infant cannot disaffirm under such conditions, either directly
or indirectly, ground their decisions on the tort of fraud. The
way in which this is done we shall consider later in our discus-
sion.
It has been objected further, as a reason for allowing the
infant to disaffirm, that to estop him might allow people to
impose on him, as they might take advantage of his very in-
fancy to get him to misrepresent his age.4 But this does uot
seem a valid reason, when standing alone, for such a decision;
for it is generally held, in the cases which estop the infant
from disaffirming, that if the misrepresentation was induced
by the other party to the transaction, or by the agent of such
party, no estoppel arises.5 As will be seen by a reference to
these cases, to make the infant liable as for a tort does not
allow designing adults to take advantage of infants, for it
holds one who contracts with an infant to the exercise of good
faith and reasonable diligence, and does not enable him to
make any profit out of the transaction with the infant, for it
allows him only compensation for the actual loss sustained.
It does not permit him to make any profit out of an executory
contract, but it simply makes good his actual loss.
Again, it has been urged that to enforce an estoppel would
encourage infants to lie in order to make contracts that would
3. 11 Cush. (65 Mass.) 40.
4. 1 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 127.
5. 80 Conn. 807.
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bind them, so that they would be enabled to waste their money
and property." However, it would seem that the same result
would be reached to serve the purpose of the infant to obtain
goods, property, or services for which he could not ordinarily
contract, regardless of whether or not the infant be estopped
and made liable. Indeed, it would appear that the inducement
to the infant would be greater in the case where he is given
the opportunity to induce another party to contract with him,
and is then allowed to escape from all liability upon such con-
tract. That is, if rules of law are to be framed to protect and
conserve the morals of infancy, that purpose may best be
served by making the infants of the land liable for their trans-
gressions. Nevertheless, it is perfectly true that the applica-
tion of such a rule would enable infants to waste their money
and property; and it remains a question of whether the
greater hardship will be worked by placing the entire burden
on one who acted reasonably, in good faith, and in reliance
on the infant's own representation, or by making that infant
liable to the extent that the other party has been actually in-
jured, and thus encouraging the infant to do the thing that
the law of contracts has been framed to protect him against.
At the same time, where an infant in personal appearance,
family surroundings, and business activities appears to be of
age, represents himself to be so, and the other party would
be greatly injured by allowing the disaffirmance, the contract
having been fairly made, and advantageous to both parties, it
is undoubtedly a hardship to strictly enforce the rule and per-
mit a disaffirmance.7 In at least one case where the infant was
estopped from disaffirming the contract, he was, at the time
6. 119 N. C. 323.
7. 147 Ky. 441.
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of the execution of the deed, at most, not more than a month
under twenty-one years of age, was a married man with two
children, and the wearer of a full beard, and both he and his
mother represented him to be of age.8 With regard to this
point it might prove interesting to quote from the opinion
of Daly, F. J., in Eckstein vs. Frank,0 where he said: "When
an infant obtains property by falsely representing himself to
be of age, an action of tort may be maintained against him,
either to recover it back or to recover damages, upon the
ground that he obtained possession of it wrongfully. It has
long been the rule in courts of equity, that an infant will be
held liable where he obtains property by a false representation
respecting his age. 'If an infant is old and cunning enough,'
says Lord Chancellor Cowper, 'to contrive and carry out a
fraud, he ought to make satisfaction for it.' (2 Eq. Ca. Ab.,
515). And the good sense and justice of requiring him to do
so has been held in the numerous cases cited to be as applica-
ble in a court of law as in a court of equity." Of course, if
the situation and appearance of the infant are not such as to
be reasonably conducive to the belief that he is of full age,
it is apparent that one of the elements of estoppel is lacking:
But where they are all present, in some jurisdictions, both at
law and in equity,10 the infant is estopped; but it is essential
that these elements of estoppel coexist: The conduct of the
infant must have been fraudulent, believed in, relied on, and
acted upon by the other party. Even then, estoppel is con-
fined to cases where the infant is in fact developed to the
condition of actual discretion, to cases of actual fraud, and
where the contract or transaction is beneficial to the minor,
8. 26 Ky. L. 48.
9. 1 Daly (N. Y.) 334, 336.
10. 92 N. J. L. 375. 131 Va. 316.
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according to the rule in some jurisditions."I Something more
than a mere failure to disclose infancy must be present in or-
der to charge the infant as for fraud, for there must be a
direct misrepresentation by the infant as to his age, and the
execution of the instrument is not in itself a sufficient repre-
sentation. 2 However, it has been held that if an infant has
arrived at the age of discretion, and, under the circumstances
of the case, it was his duty to disclose his minority, he may
be estopped by his failure to do so.' s
In order that what we have said with regard to estoppel
both at law and in equity may not be misinterpreted, it may
be well to state that there have been some distinctions made,
as is shown by the case of Hayes vs. Parker,14 decided in 1886,
where the court said, "At law it is conclusively presumed that
a person within the age of twenty-one is unfitted for business,
and that every contract into which he enters is to his disad-
vantage, and that he is incapable of fraudulent acts which will
estop him from interposing the shield of infancy against its
enforcement. In equity, however, this rigid rule has its ex-
ceptions. Equity will regard the circumstances surrounding
the transaction-the appearance of the minor, his intelligence,
the character of his representations, the advantage he has
gained by the fraudulent representations, and the disadvan-
tage to which the person deceived has been put by them in
determining whether he should be permitted to invoke suc-
cessfully the plea of infancy."
By force of statute, in some jurisdictions, no contract or
transaction can be disaffirmed where, on account of the in-
11. 142 Wis. 556.
12. 23 Ont. A. 47.
13. 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 69.
14. 41 N. J. Eq. 630, 631 and 632.
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fant's misrepresentation as to his majority, the other party
had good reason to believe him capable of contracting. 5 As
an example of such a statute, Section 3190 of the Iowa Stat-
utes might be cited, which reads as follows: "No contract can
be thus disaffirmed where, on account of minor's own mis-
representations as to his majority * * * the other party
had good reason to believe him capable of contracting." This
has been interpreted to mean some affirmative or definite state-
ment, not made by a person other than the infant himself, in-
tended to mislead and to create a belief in the mind of the
other party that he is capable of contracting.' Naturally, it
is a question of fact for the jury whether the infant's acts
and statements naturally and reasonably induced a belief in
the mind of the other party that he was of full age, and led
the other party to deal with him on that assumption. 7
It has been objected that it is anomalous that an infant
should be made liable for hisfraud in making a thing which
he is not capable of making; and this has been met by the
statement that the only satisfactory test is supplied by the
answer to the question, "Can the infant be held liable without
directly or indirectly enforcing his promise?"' 8  The courts
which estop the infant from disaffirming say that there is no
enforcement of a promise where an infant who has been guilty
of a positive fraud is made to answer for the actual loss, as
distinguished from the prospective loss on an executory con-
tract, his wrong caused to one who dealt with him in good faitb,
and who exercised due diligence.
15. 43 Kan. 77. 187 Mo. App. 510. (Decided under the Kansas Statutes).
16. 192 Ia. 427.
17. 245 S. W. 478. (Ct. of Civ. App. of Tex.)
18. 108 Ind. 472.
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This leads us directly, then, to the question of enforcing
tort liability against the infant, even though he is not, strictly
speaking, liable on the contract According to the recognized
rules. Some courts will not attempt to establish the liability
by any such circuitous method, and will neither hold the infant
liable in tort for deceit, nor for damages to property while
in his possession and in his use by reason of the contract. 9
Other courts take the view that the result must be the same,
whether it is in tort that the infant is made liable, or on the
contract; and therefore, rather than further involve he litiga-
tion, they make the infant immediately liable on the contract,
with the idea that the same results must follow in either case.20
They say that minority is given for the protection of a person
under age, but it cannot be used as a weapon with which to
commit fraud; thus harking back to a figure that these judges
seem exceedingly fond of, and one which is frequently to be
found in their opinions-namely, that infancy is a shield to
be used for the protection of the minor, and is not a sword
which he may wield to perpetrate a fraud. However, the doc-
trine of estoppel is not generally applied to executory con-
tracts, for to do so would be to base the action on the promise,
a situation which would be somewhat difficult to reconcile with
the theory of tort liability where the infant has misrepresented
his age.
The early idea was that the infant was liable only for
torts which are vi et armis, and that misrepresentations are a
part of the contract, for which an infant cannot be made lia-
ble.2I But while the early English cases assumed this position,
19. 230. Mass. 54.
20. 88 Miss. 668.
21. Sid. pt. 1. 258; 1 Keble 913; 1 Lev. 169. (Cited by all three of
these reperters).
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the modern view, as we have seen, has changed somewhat;
but even yet there is such a division of authority that it can-
not be said with any degiee of certainty that either view
carries with it the weight of present day opinion. The argu-
ment, then, assume. sometbing of this aspect: Why not apply
tort principles, as misrepresentation is essentially a tort? But
why hold the infant liable for misrepresentation, when this
destroys the very reason of the rule, which is that an infant
shall be protected against any liability on his contracts, be-
cause he is incapable of protecting his own interests? If a
satisfactory distinction is to be found, a solution which will
at once satisfy common justice and careful legal reasoning,
it may be in the fact that, strictly speaking, no contract is
made as to the infant's age, but that it is the fraud that in-
duces the contract, and is therefore antecedent to the contract.
On such a basis, the action may be ex delicto rather than ex
contractu.
'This would apparently indicate that all that is necessary
in order to hold the infant liable is to bring a tort rather than
a contract action. However, this is not the case, for the action
must rest solely on the wrong committed by the infant. 22 This
point was raised in a case decided in 1923, that of Greens-
boro Morris Plan Co. et al. v. Palmer et al.,23 where the ma-
jority of the court held that where the original complaint
against an infant alleged the execution of a note and mortgage
by the infant, his default in payment, the seizure and sale of
the mortgaged truck, and sought to recover the balance due on
the note after such sale, an amended complaint, alleging de-
ceit by the infant in misrepresenting his age, which claimed
22. 206 N. Y. 288.
23. 185 N. C. 109.
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the exact amount of the indebtedness as damages caused by
the fraud, showed a manifest purpose to collect the unpaid
balance due on the note by transforming an action on contract
into an action in tort, which is not permitted. A dissenting
opinion by Stacy, J., in that case, illustrates the quandary into
which the courts have been thrown on this matter, and at the
same time serves to show a tendency to break away from the
old rules:
"The suit is not to enforce the contract; it is alleged that
there is none. The action is based upon the tort of deceit. The
measure of damages is different from what it would be in an
action founded on contract. The plaintiff is not entitled to
recover the purchase price of the machine, or the balance due
under the contract, for the infant may have agreed to pay too
much. The plaintiff is limited in its recovery to what it has
actually lost
.'An infant who obtains my property by deceit injures me
no less than the infant who negligently destroys that which is
mine. If he is liable in the latter case, where the heart is free
from guilt, why should he not be required to answer in the
former, where forsooth his moral turpitude makes the injury
more reprehensible on his part, if not more grievous to me."
Williston24 quotes with approval the summary of the pres-
ent English law upon the subject of contracts, that the law
"has scrupulously stopped short of enforcing, against the
infant a contractual obligation, entered into while he was an
infant even by means of a fraud." He says, "Whether the
infant is liable in tort for deceit in misrepresenting his age
24. Willlston. Law of contracts, Section 245.
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is not so clear. There is considerable authority that he is not.
The soundest view, however, is that the infant is liable."
The entire matter may well be summed up by a brief quota-
tion from the case of Creer v. Active Automobile Exch., Inc.,25
decided in 1923, where, in an exceedingly well reasoned opin-
ion, Keeler, J., said: "The underlying reason running through
the cases supporting the action of tort against the infant seems
to be that, if an infant is held estopped from setting up his
infancy because of fraudulent representation at the time of
making the contract, and for that reason is held to the terms
of the contract as if of full age, thereby his right of rescission
may in many cases be seriously impaired, in that he is held
to the full damages of a breach of contract which in many
cases may be seriously unfair, -owing to his inexperience in
making an improvident agreement, while, if the remedy of the
other party is confined to an action of tort, the latter will re-
cover the actual damages suffered from the fact of deceit,
which is all to which he is in fairness entitled. Since then
the tort of the infant is held not to be involved in the formation
of the contract and hence defensive against his attempt to
rescind, it follows that the remedy of the other party, if any,
is an action for a tort, either brought independently or prop-
erly set up by a counterclaim or cross-complaint."
JAMES T. BRITT, '26.
25. 99 Conn. 266, 273.
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